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IV. INTRODUCTION 
This Reply Brief of Cross-Appellant, Lynda Wood ("Ms. Wood"), 
responds to issues raised in the Reply Brief of Cross-Appellee, 
Neil R. Mitchell ("Mr. Mitchell"") to the Cross-Appeal. 
The facts relevant to this Reply Brief are set forth in 
Section VIII of the Cross-Appeal in Ms. Wood's Brief of Appellee 
and are incorporated herein by this reference. 
V ARGUMENT 
A. MARJORIE WAS ENTITLED TO THE PROCEEDS OF HER LATE HUSBAND'S 
PERSONAL INJURY SETTLEMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW 
The trial court incorrectly concluded that Marjorie Sims 
("Marjorie") was not entitled to the settlement of Grant Sims' 
("Grant") personal injury suit. Under U.C.A. § 78-ll-12(b), 
Marjorie, as Grant's personal representative and only intestate 
heir, was entitled to reimbursement for expenses she incurred 
caring for Grant as a result of his injury. However, the trial 
court assumed against evidence to the contrary that Grant paid his 
own medical expenses. Since Marjorie actually paid nearly 
$19,000.00 for Grant's and her combined medical expenses, while 
his records show that he paid little over $100.00, the $12,445.86 
settlement of his personal injury suit was rightfully Marjorie's. 
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The personal injury survival statute states, 
If prior to judgment or settlement the injured 
person dies as a result of a cause other than 
the injury received as a result of a wrongful 
act or negligence of the wrongdoer, the 
personal representative or heirs of that 
person are entitled to receive no more than 
the out-of-pocket expenses incurred by or on 
behalf of that injured person as the result of 
his injury. 
(U.C.A. § 78-ll-12(b)) (emphasis added) 
The statute has never been interpreted or explained by Utah 
appellate courts. The trial court's interpretation, however, was 
in error as it seemed to rest on the incorrect assumption that 
Grant paid his own medical expenses. Therefore, it falls on this 
Court to render an explanation of this statute which is consistent 
with decided Utah Supreme Court cases interpreting a similarly 
worded statute in a wrongful death action. 
The court below explained that the settlement in Grant's suit 
was received after the death of Mr. Sims, it 
was for actual expenses incurred by Mr. Sims 
as a result of the personal injury, and 
pursuant to statute is required to be paid 
over to the personal representative of the 
deceased's (Mr. Sims') Estate . . . . [T]he 
funds were properly paid over to Mrs. Sims in 
her capacity as personal representative, and 
should have been deposited in the accounts of 
the Estate, the funds representing expenses 
incurred personally by Mr. Sims as a result of 
the personal injury case. 
(emphasis added) 
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In this statement, the trial court made several errors of 
fact and law. First, the court incorrectly stated that Grant paid 
his own medical expenses resulting from the personal injury. 
However, this is unsupported by any evidence. On the contrary, the 
evidence proved Marjorie paid nearly all Grant's medical expenses. 
The final accounting of Grant's Estate shows he only paid $112.30 
in medical bills from the time of his injury, approximately one 
year before his death. (R.461). Marjorie's Estate, on the other 
hand, expended $18,943.30 from 1990 - 1991 on medical bills, 
attributed by the accounting to either Grant or "Both", that is, 
between Marjorie and Grant. (R. 462). Marjorie's pocket, not 
Grant's, bore the greater loss from the medical expenses resulting 
from Grant's personal injury. Thus, under the trial court's 
reasoning, the settlement should provide for the expenses paid by 
Marjorie, not by Grant. 
Second, the court was also incorrect in its interpretation of 
the law. As the statute indicates, the judgment or settlement 
should go to the personal representative to cover out-of-pocket 
expenses incurred on behalf of the injured person. The statutes 
only limitations restrict (a) the judgment or settlement to the 
personal representative or heir, (b) the amount to out-of-pocket 
expenses resulting from the injury, and (c) the expenses to those 
incurred either by the injured party or on behalf of the injured 
party. The statute does not require that the settlement be turned 
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over to the decedent's estate. 
This would be a fair and logical conclusion if the decedent 
had incurred the expenses and thus stood to be reimbursed. The 
statute on its face gives the right to collect out-of-pocket 
expenses to the party who has incurred the debt. Thus, where the 
personal representative and only interested heir, Marjorie, 
incurred the expenses out of her own pocket on the decedent's 
behalf, the fair and logical conclusion is that the settlement 
should reimburse the personal representative. 
Mr. Mitchell has argued the amount should be put in Grant' s 
Estate and then disbursed to the heirs. However, this would not 
reimburse Marjorie' s Estate for her expenditures and financial 
loss, not to mention her personal loss. Instead, the settlement 
would ultimately go to Mr. Mitchell, his mother Elna Mitchell, and 
Ms. Wood, none of whom bore any expense from Grant' s injury. 
Marjorie, on the other hand, would still be limited to money from 
Grant' s Estate for her health, support and maintenance; she would 
not have been able to seek reimbursement for Grant' s medical 
expenses from his Estate without raising another claim. Thus, the 
settlement should be awarded to Marjorie' s Estate in compliance 
with the statute. 
Third, the Cross-Appellee in his Reply Brief to Cross-
Appellant's memorandum states that the relevant statute, U.C.A. § 
78-11-12, provides that the proceeds of a settlement would go to 
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the personal representative of decedent's estate if he died with a 
valid will or to an intestate heir if he did not die with a valid 
will. This interpretation is not necessarily true. A personal 
representative is appointed under Utah law regardless of whether 
there was a valid will at death. See U.C.A. § 75-3-301(4). Thus, 
the existence or non-existence of a valid will as Cross-Appellee 
argues does not explain the use of "the personal representative or 
heirs" by the legislature. 
The interpretation of the above personal injury survival 
statute has not been interpreted by Utah courts. Therefore, the 
Court should look to the interpretation of a similar statute 
concerning wrongful death actions, In re Behm's Estater 213 P.2d 
657 (Utah 1950). In that case, the Utah Supreme Court interpreted 
the wrongful death statute, §104-3-111 U.C.A. (1943), which uses 
the same words "his heirs or his personal representatives" as the 
recipient of the proceeds as in the personal injury survival 
statute now before the Court. The court considered the 
reimbursement of a husband from his late wife's estate for expenses 
related to her illness and burial. The court remarked, " [t]o 
distribute the fund in proportion to the losses suffered makes the 
allocation more consonant with the underlying theory of damages. . 
. . To reduce [the surviving husband's] interest in recovery below 
the amount he so expended would deny him the right to recover the 
sum he was legally required to pay as a result of the wrongdoer's 
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negligence" Id. at 661-62. Thus, the court concluded, "The 
wording of this section compels a conclusion that the legislature 
intended that the proceeds obtained from the wrongdoer would not be 
intermingled with other assets of the estate of the deceased." Id. 
at 660. 
While Behm and it' s reasoning pertain to a wrongful death 
situation, the language of the statute and its rationale are the 
same for a personal injury. The Court should recognize the statute 
is intended only to reimburse the estate of the deceased where the 
deceased incurred the medical expenses relating to his injury, but 
that the personal representative should be reimbursed where she 
incurred the expenses on the deceased's behalf. 
Accordingly, the Court should overturn the lower court's 
holding in this matter and award Mar jorie's Estate $12,445.86 from 
the settlement of Grant's personal injury suit in her capacity as 
personal representative of Grant' s Estate. Marjorie is entitled to 
the settlement as reimbursement for the expenses she incurred 
providing for her husband's medical care and she would have a claim 
against Cross-Appellee's estate for the same amount if the Court 
were to deny Cross-Appellant's claim. 
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B. APPELLANTS SHOULD NOT BE AWARDED INTEREST ON THE CASH 
DEFICIENCY OF $48,100.00 AS APPELLEE OFFERED THE AMOUNT IN 
SETTLEMENT PRIOR TO THIS CLAIM AND APPELLANT REFUSED THE OFFER 
The trial court erred in awarding interest on the $48,100.00 
Cash Deficiency to Mr. Mitchell because Ms. Wood offered to repay 
that amount to Mr. Mitchell prior to this claim and several times 
since and Mr. Mitchell has consistently refused her offer. 
Further, the award of interest was not a part of the trial court' s 
original decision but was added for the first time in the Order. 
Therefore, in fairness to Ms. Wood for her good faith offers, and 
consistency with the trial court' s Order, the Court should withdraw 
the award of interest and limit the award to the $48,100.00 Cash 
Deficiency. 
Since Ms. Wood offered to repay the cash deficiency almost as 
soon as it was requested, it would be unfair for Cross-Appellee to 
expect an award of interest simply for rejecting the offer. 
According to the Utah Supreme Courts principle that rules 
regarding damages on conversion "can be modified in the interest of 
fairness, Winters v. Charles Anthony Jewelers, 586 P.2d 453, 454 
(1978), this Court should eliminate the award of interest. 
Additionally, the trial court did not award interest on the 
Cash Deficiency in its Memorandum Decision, nor does it appear the 
court intended to award interest on this amount. The addition of 
interest was added for the first time in the Order itself. In a 
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personal memo by Judge Hanson (Appendix "A"), which was not sent to 
either party, the Judge explained, "Marjorie Sims' Estate agrees 
that $48,100 should come back to the George Sims Estate, but 
without interest, inasmuch as they offered that amount as soon as 
it was requested, and that is probably legitimate. . . . I ought 
to grant Summary Judgment to the George Sims Estate, the claimant, 
against the Marjorie Sims Estate for the $48,100 without interest 
. . ." (R. 517-18) (emphasis added). In the Memorandum Decision, 
all the trial court awarded was "the $48,100 which the personal 
representative of Marjorie Sims Estate has offered to return 
heretofore.n (R. 512). Despite this decision, the Orders for 
Motions on Summary Judgment directed Marjorie' s Estate to pay 
$48,100.00 with interest added at 10% per annum. (R. 521 ). 
Further, a tender of the converted property prior to the 
commencement of the action will serve to reduce the damages of the 
claimant. Colby v. Reed. 99 U.S. 560, L.Ed. 484 (1879). These 
matters were argued to the trial court in final argument. (R. 
563). Despite all these facts, the Order drafted by Mr. Mitchell,s 
attorneys and signed by the trial court awarded interest on this 
amount. The Cross-Appellant takes the position that the imposition 
of interest on the Cash Deficiency was error where the Cross-
Appellant offered to return the same amount prior to the claim 
being made and the Appellant refused that offer and where the trial 
judge appeared to have decided against the imposition of interest. 
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VI. CONCLUSION AND RELIEF REQUESTED 
Lynda Wood respectfully requests this Court find in her favor 
and reverse the trial court's ruling on the Personal Injury 
Settlement and on the imposition of interest on the Cash 
Deficiency. Since the personal injury survival statute seeks to 
reimburse the party damaged by the decedent1 s injury, and it was 
Marjorie who was so damaged, financially as well as personally, the 
settlement should be awarded to Marjorie Sims' Estate in 
reimbursement. Also, the imposition of interest on the Cash 
Deficiency should be withdrawn as it is unfair to Marjorie' s 
Estate which offered to return the Cash Deficiency though Mr. 
Mitchell rejected the offer, and contrary to the trial court' s 
express intent in it' s memo and Order. 
DATED this -< / day of January, 1996 
JOHN L. McCOY (2164) 
Attorney tor Lynda Wood-Appellant 
310 S. Main Street #1305 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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Judge Hanson 
January 18, 1995 
In the Matter of the Estat< 
'^fyy^fia 
Case No. 933900278 
There are reciprocal Motions for Summary Judgment in this 
matter, wherein the Estate of George Sims has made a claim against 
the Estate of Marjorie Sims, which is the matter before the Court. 
George Sims' Estate, through its successor personal representative, 
claims that Marjorie Sims, before she died, diverted sums out of 
the George Sims Estate that should be paid back. The substance of 
the claim is that she failed to set up and fund a trust that was 
provided for in the George Sims Will. There is really no dispute 
that she failed to set up the trust with the funds from the George 
Sims Estate, but rather she used them for her own purposes. 
The Estate of Marjorie Sims argues that while there has been 
a technical breach, there is no damage as required by the statute, 
and so I need to look at the statute that authorizes these types of 
claims. The Marjorie Sims Estate, represented by attorney McCoy, 
says there is no damage because she was entitled to the funds in 
any event. 
0 ft ft £ i a 
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It is clear that she was entitled to the interest. It is not 
so clear that she was entitled to an invasion of the principal. 
There are apparently two lines of cases: Wyoming, Montana, Kansas 
line and a Colorado line, that talk about whether or not the 
language necessary is limited to the invasion of principal when the 
funds of the beneficiary (in this case, Mrs. Sims, while she was 
alive), are able to take care of her own needs. 
It seems that the better cases are that she would have got the 
principal in any event, therefore, no damages. 
Marjorie Sims' Estate agrees that $48,100 should come back to 
the George Sims Estate, but without interest, inasmuch as they 
offered that as soon as it was requested, and that is probably 
legitimate. The remaining portions of the $48,100 up to the 
$52,000 claimed (and see the chart in this regard), are either 
interest or principal, I'm unable to tell, but if she would have 
got them either as interest or principal then, of course, there is 
no damage. 
The $12,000 for the personal injury claim is not a matter that 
Mrs. Sims was entitled to, but rather was part of the Estate, and 
so it would appear that would have to come back. This is not like 
a wrongful death claim where she is the heir of the wrongful death 
claim, but rather the Estate is the recipient of his personal 
injury claim, so the $12,000 should come back to the Estate; the 
0 0 ft q; 1 ^  
-3-
$41,800 they agreed to; the rest, if I accept McCoy's argument, are 
matters that she would have been entitled to in any event, and 
therefore there is no damage. 
It looks like Summary Judgment ought to be granted both ways 
in some respects. On McCoy's claim, the $96,000-plus in accordance 
with the chart, whether it is interest or principal of the George 
Sims Estate, and the trust if it would have been set up, would have 
gone to her in any event for reasonable and necessary living 
expenses, regardless of the amount of income that she had. 
Everything beyond the $48,100 in the second category of $52,000 
would be either principal or interest that she would have been 
entitled to, therefore that doesn't constitute a damage, and so I 
should grant Summary Judgment to the Marjorie Sims Estate on that 
issue. 
On the other hand, I ought to grant Summary Judgment to the 
George Sims Estate, the claimant, against the Marjorie Sims Estate 
for the $48,100 without interest, and then the amount of the 
personal injury claim - $12,000-plus, because that was part of the 
George Sims Estate and not something she should have taken as 
personal representative before she died. 
The personal injury amount ($12,000-plus) so also include 
interest from the date that it was received. So there will be 
Summary Judgment in favor of Wilson's client against the Marjorie 
Sims Estate in that amount. 
